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Building Judicial Integrity in China
BY HUALING FU*
Judicial reforms aimed at improving rule of law and ethical
integrity in China have been an ongoing goal of the Chinese
government since the late 1970s. In the context of China, rule of law
and judicial integrity have unique characteristics. In the 2010 Code
of Conduct for Judges and 2010 Basic Standards of Professional
Ethics for Judges in the People's Republic of China, the Chinese
Supreme People's Court requires judges to be loyal to the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), the Constitution, and the law.
Additionally, judges are required by the Supreme People's Court to
be both politically reliable and professionally competent.'
This article addresses the following questions: How has judicial
reform progressed in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and what
defines the court system in an authoritarian state that is struggling for
integrity and the rule of law? Are courts and their judges politically
independent? Can the law be applied judicially in adjudication? How
widespread is judicial corruption in China? And, can legal reforms
provide at least partial remedies to ethical problems that Chinese
courts face? In order to answer these questions, we first need to
examine the context surrounding China's ongoing judicial reform. The
courts are an integral part of the country's political system, and
judicial reform cannot take place in isolation. In order to be
successful, judicial reform must be embedded in the larger political,
* Professor at the University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law. The author would like to Keith
Hand, Morris Ratner, and other participants in the Professional Ethical Integrity Symposium
for their very useful comments on the paper.
1. Faguan Xingwei Guifan (4$Y##0) [Code of Conduct for Judges] (promulgated
by the Sup. People's Ct., Dec. 6, 2010, effective Dec. 6, 2010) Westlaw China;
Zhonghuarenminguoheguo Faguan Zhiye Daode Jiben Zhunze ( RfJ11$ill'
ijiggItgJ) [Basic Standards of the People's Republic of China on Professional Ethics of
Judges] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Dec. 6, 2010, effective Dec. 6, 2010) Westlaw
China.
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bureaucratic, and social contexts from which judges originate and
courts operate.
I. Context of Judicial Reform
Judicial reform in China, as is the case anywhere, does not take
place in a vacuum. The reform is embedded in a particular political
and social context. There are three important contextual issues to
consider in studying China's judicial reform.
First, the political context affects the parameters of reform.
China is a one party authoritarian state where the ruling CCP has its
leadership position entrenched in the Constitution. This allows the
CCP to dominate legal reform and control judges. The Chinese
Constitution is hostile to the doctrine of separation of powers and
judicial independence has always been taboo. The political
domination of the CCP has such a significant impact on the
independence of the court and the judicial process, that the entire
judicial framework is absorbed into the political process.
Judges are CCP members first and judges second. The CCP
openly demands that courts be secondary to the larger political
system, and the courts willingly comply. This political-legal
community is composed of judges, prosecutors, police officers,
prison guards, and of course, lawyers. As members of the larger
political-legal community under the direct leadership of the CCP,
judges, in principle, are first and foremost loyal to the CCP and
subject to its instruction and discipline. When there is a conflict of
demands between CCP instructions and legal requirements, judges
know exactly where their primary loyalty lies. The CCP's instructions
are more consequential than legal requirements because of the
political context in which the courts operate.
Second, the bureaucratic setting of the court system also impacts
the behavior of many Chinese judges. It is commonly accepted that
the prevailing legal practice in China permits a degree of
independence of adjudication by the court as an institution. However,
it does not allow the exercise of independent adjudication by judges
as individuals.2 There is a rigid and rigorous bureaucratic control
2. YUHUA WANG, TYING THE AUTOCRAT'S HANDS: THE RISE OF THE RULE OF LAW IN
CHINA (2015); ALBERT CHEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (LexisNexis 4th ed., 2011).
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within the court, and trial judges, often placed at the bottom of the
judicial hierarchy, must receive multiple approvals before making
their decision. A routine criticism of the Chinese judiciary is the fact
that the individuals adjudicating cases do not have the necessary
authority to decide those cases. Against the backdrop of this
bureaucratic system, judges tend to behave more like team players on
a large assembly line than individual decision-makers; thus, the
system of bureaucratic discipline that prevails in China transforms
judging into a collective system. One of the ongoing judicial reforms
is to increase the authority of trial judges in rendering decisions; that
seemingly innocuous reform has encountered resistance not only
from the political authorities outside the court, but also from senior
management judges within the court.3
Third, the social context in which judges operate should be
considered when analyzing judicial integrity in China. The judiciary
represents one of many professional groups in China. Judges and
non-judges operate within a shared social milieu and find themselves
subject to similar incentives that shape their professional behavior.
Social constraints that affect the professional behavior of doctors,
accountants, educators, and other professionals have an equal impact
on judges. Judicial reform, in an effort to build ethical integrity, is
constrained by the general ethical standard in society. Therefore,
judicial reform must be embedded in the society in which it
functions. If the Party extends its political control to all state
institutions and the fabric of society, it is hard for courts to resist this
political overreach on their own. Similarly, if corruption is a
prevalent social ill, it is impossible for judges to be immune to this
disease. Professionalism and ethical integrity are systemic issues that
rise and fall at a general level.
These contextual constraints impact the ethical integrity of
Chinese judges and create powerful institutional barriers to their
professional development. It is unsurprising that a common perception
of Chinese judges is that they are not politically independent due to the
entrenched leadership of the Communist Party in the PRC legal
system. Individual judges are directly "accountable" to the
bureaucratic system inside the courts because in China judges are akin
to cogs in a larger machine, rather than individual judicial decision-
3. Li Jingyun ( Court Reform is not Merely to End Performance Evaluation,
SOUTHERN METROPOLIS DAILY, Feb. 1, 2015, http://epaper.oeeee.com/epaper/A/html/2015-
02/01/content 3383582.htm?div=0.
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makers. Moreover, professional ethics in the judiciary is a
microcosm of the ethical standard in the society at large.
II. The Possibility of Judicial Integrity in Authoritarian
States and its Limits
So what of the evolution of the ethical judicial integrity of this
particular political, bureaucratic, and cultural context? China's
authoritarian state strives for the rule of law, in a limited sense, and
relies on an efficient and effective judiciary for dispute resolution,
pronouncing and enforcing rules, and limiting local states.'
Rule of law serves at least three objectives for the party-state.
First, it legitimizes powers; generations of party and state leaders in
China have embraced the concept of rule of law. In particular,
emerging leaders in the early years of their terms in office tend to
emphasize the rule of law in their efforts to conquer opposition and
win the hearts of ordinary citizens. Without exception, Chinese
leaders including Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jingtao all
embraced the rhetoric of rule of law in the early years of their terms
in office.5 If a political leader lacks charisma or an appealing
ideology, they regularly resort to the rhetoric of the rule of law while
exercising political powers. 6
Second, the central government may rely on the rule of law, and
an effective judiciary in particular, to rein in local governments. In
China's unitary state, the central government encounters both a
significant asymmetry in information as well as nearly insurmountable
barriers to the implementation of national policy at the local level.'
Resources for monitoring the performance of local officials and
ensuring local compliance of central policies are limited. There are a
limited number of instruments in the central government's toolkit to
4. TOM GINSBURG & TAMIR MOUSTAFA, RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES (2008).
5. Fu Hualing ({$9{#), Challenging Authoritarianism Through Law: Potential and
Limit, 6 NAT'L TAIWAN UNIV. L. REV. 339 (2011).
6. See generally RULE BY LAW, supra note 4 (for a general study of reliance on law in
authoritarian states).
7. Cigi Mei and Margaret M. Pearson, Killing a Chicken to Scare the Monkeys?
Deterrence Failure and Local Defiance In China, 72 CHINA J. 75 (2014); and Yongshun Cai
and Lin Zhu, Disciplining Local Officials in China: The Case of Conflict Management, 70
CHINA J. 98 (2013).
170 [Vol. 39:1
Building Judicial Integrity in China
identify, prevent, and punish local defiance. Extralegal measures
through party disciplines, are a commonly used strategy in extending
active central control over local governments. The ongoing
anticorruption campaign clearly demonstrates that instrument, along
with the party-state's use of the rule of law in conquering local
resistance.9 As Yuhua Wang explains, law can be used to tie the
hands of (petty) autocrats.10
Third, rule of law may have proved to be the most effective
mechanism for dispute resolution in the long run. China's rapid
social and economic transition has produced tremendous stress and
generated a large number of disputes. The party-state has resorted to
a variety of extralegal ways to manage those disputes." Suppression
of disputes and dispute resolution that is based on political
expedience have failed miserably in achieving effective and fair
settlements. As numerous studies on the Chinese petition system has
shown, unprincipled dispute resolution that bypasses the legal system
eventually exacerbates social conflict and becomes a destabilizing
force in and of itself.' 2 There was serious soul-searching in the post-
Hu era (2002-2012) related to the danger of using extra-law in social
control. With the renewed efforts by the CCP's Central Committee's
Fourth Plenum on further development of the legal system, China
resumed and broadened the reform of building a socialist system.13
8. Hualing Fu (f{4f), Wielding the Sword: President Xi's New Anti-Corruption
Campaign, in GREED, CORRUPTION, AND THE MODERN STATE: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL
EcoNoMY (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Paul Lagunes eds., Edward Elgar Nov. 2015).
9. See generally Rachel E. Stem, The Political Logic of China's New Environmental
Courts, 72 THE CHINA J. 53 (2014) and Mary E. Gallagher & Baohua Dong, Legislating
Harmony: Labor Law Reform in Contemporary China, in FROM IRON-RICE BOWL TO
INFORMALIZATION: MARKETS, STATE AND WORKERS IN A CHANGING CHINA 36 (Mary E
Gallagher et al. eds., 2011) (for the examples of renewed attempts to use courts to rein in
local resistance in environmental protection and labor standard respectively).
10. Wang, supra note 2, at 158.
11. Fu, supra, note 5; Hualing Fu ( Mediation and the Rule ofLaw: The Chinese
Landscape, in FORMAuSATION AND FLEXIBILISATION IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION (Joachim Zekoll
et al. eds., 2015); Carl F. Minzner, China's Turn Against Law, 59 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
COMPARATIvE LAW 935 (2001).
12. Liangjiang Li et al., Petitioning Beying: The High Tide of 2003-2006, 210 CHINA Q.
313 (2012); Carl F. Minzner, Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions
42 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 103 (2006); Yanhua Deng and Kevin. J.
O'Brien, Relational Repression in China: Using Social Ties to Demobilize Protesters 214
CHINA Q. 533 (2013).
13. Communique of the 4th Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of
Communist Party of China (Dec. 2, 2014), available at http://www.china.org.cn/china
1712016]
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There is an emerging consensus among political elites that dispute
resolution, based on the rule of law and legal principles, is the most
cost-effective way to resolve the vast majority of the cases. 14
Of course, China has demonstrated unique characteristics in its
legal development that are strongly associated with its political
system. Putting China in a historical and comparative context, there
is strong reason to argue that China is following an East Asian Model
(EAM) of developmental state.15 In that model there is state-led
economic reform followed by the development of commercial rule of
law to facilitate the market economy. At the initial stage, the state
promotes civil law rights (such as the freedom of contract) and social
and economic rights (including consumer rights, labor rights, and
rights to equal treatment), yet limits collective rights and political
rights. As the economy grows, the state invests more in institutions,
trains professionals, improves education, and diverts resources to
human development. From that stage onward, the state is on the
defensive and starts to jealously guard its power and privilege,
refusing to make further concessions unless absolutely necessary.
But, by that late stage, the economy has changed, society has
changed, and people have changed, creating persistent demand for
rule of law, government accountability, and an expansion of
collective and political rights. This is the trajectory of incremental
growth and managed legal development that China is following.
China is on this EAM trajectory and legal reforms are taking
place decisively within the framework of its authoritarian system.
There is an inherent tension between the need to uphold the
authoritarian rule and the imperative to live up to the Party's own
rhetoric. An authoritarian system struggling for a degree of rule of
law undoubtedly constrains the scope of judicial reform.
China prioritizes the supply side of the rule of law, but there has
been a gradual shift to the demand side. The supply side includes
legal rules and the institutions that apply those legal rules with courts
/fourthi-plenary-session/2014-12/02/content_34208801 .htm.
14. Randall Peerenboom, The Future of Legal Reforms in China: A Critical Appraisal
of the Decision on Comprehensively Deepening Reform, Soc. Sci. Res. Network (Jan. 14,
2014), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2379 161.
15. See generally RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA MODERNIZES: THREAT TO THE WEST
OR MODEL FOR THE REST? (2008) (for an elaboration of this model), and RANDALL
PEERENBOOM & TOM GINSBURG, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT OF MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES:
AVOIDING THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP (2014) (for a discussion of the correlation between
national wealth and legal development).
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at the center. On the demand side, citizens are aware of their rights
and the political-legal culture in a given society, while lawyers and
social organizations channel disputes into legal institutions and
facilitate protecting those rights.
It is expected that in the beginning of building the rule of law,
rulemaking, as a top-down process, has the priority. After all, rule of
law requires that there are rules in existence which need to be
enforced. Once the rules are made, it is often the case that those rules
are not properly enforced, and the rule of law appears to be
superficial, lacking serious commitment. The second stage of reform is
often about building institutional capacity. In China, generally, there
is an effective supply of rules and institutions but there is insufficient
channeling between the world in which disputes have occurred and
the world in which disputes can be resolved. A weak channeling
function of the law appears to be a bottleneck in the Chinese law
reform as in the case of other transition countries.' 6 As Charles R.
Epp" forcefully argued, what distinguishes a weak legal system,
such as that of India, from a strong legal system, such as that of
Canada, is not the rules or institutions of the respective country, but
the support structure, which principally includes the legal profession,
non-governmental organizations, and other intermediaries that play a
channeling function. In building a legal system, empowering lawyers
is as important as enhancing the capacity of judges. There cannot be
a well functioning legal system without an effective and competent
legal profession.
Additionally, it is possible for authoritarian states to create an
effective legal system which can respect freedom, protect rights, and
develop a degree of rule of law. The party-state in China is
adaptable, resilient, and largely legitimate in the eyes of the general
public, partly because it creates legal rights and has them enforced
through a judicial process in response to societal need." But, like
16. Fu Hualing ({$$f), Access to Justice and Constitutionalism in China, in
BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA 163 (Stephanie Balme and Michael W. Dowdle
eds., 2009); Mary Gallagher, Mobilizing the Law in China: "Informed Disenchantment"
and the Development of the Legal Consciousness, LAW & Soc'Y REV. 783 (2006); Fu
Hualing (ft*), "Use the Law as Your Weapon!" Institutional Change and Legal
Mobilization in China, in ENGAGING THE LAW IN CHINA: STATE, SOCIETY, AND POSSIBILITIES
FOR JUSTICE 54 (Neil Diamant et al. eds., 2005).
17. CHARLES R. EPp, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME
COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998).
18. Andrew J. Nathan, Authoritarian Resilience, 14 J. DEMOCRACY 6 (2003). Martin
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other transition states, China prioritizes rule of law and the protection
of rights in selective policy areas depending on the perceived
necessity and feasibility. Consistent with legal development in
authoritarian societies, there is more rule of law in commerce and
trade but less in media, religion, criminal law, and other politically
sensitive areas. 19 There are also areas, such as anticorruption, in
which the law remains largely silent. In general, the law is more
effective and consequential in civil law rights or socioeconomic
rights than political rights. Therefore, legal dualism exists. A
professional justice serves for the vast majority of ordinary cases,
and a politicized justice serves for a range of exceptional cases, as
discussed below.
That dualism has also caused a dilemma in the judiciary when
facing cases of different political natures. For example, is the
judiciary in China independent? This is not a meaningful question
without referring to the particular context in which the question is
posed. Any possible answer would have to be case specific,
institution specific and context specific. 20 In the Chinese case, courts
are structurally dependent on China's political system, and they are
unlikely to gain any institutional independence as long as the existing
political system remains. But, the courts can achieve a degree of
operational independence in the actual adjudication of cases
depending on the nature of cases involved. There will continue to be
politically sensitive cases such as the corruption cases involving
political elites or cases concerning political dissent. In those
exceptional cases, the courts will continue to depend on political
instructions and defer to political order.
However, in the vast majority of cases involving civil and
commercial matters, courts can be independent even within the
authoritarian system. In ordinary civil and criminal justice matters,
the concern is no longer judicial independence or the lack thereof,
but accountability on the part of the judges and a smarter way of
supervision and control. The CCP has shown little interest in
interfering with ordinary civil and commercial disputes and is
Dimitrove, The Resilient Authoritarians, CURRENT HISTORY 24 (2008).
19. RANDALL PEERENBOOM, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL
RULE OF LAW PROMOTION (2009).
20. Fu Hualing (f$%{), Putting China's Judiciary into Perspective: Is it Independent,
Competent and Fair?, in BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE
RULE OF LAW 193 (Erik Jensen & Tom Heller eds., 2003).
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satisfied to leave their resolution to the courts. Once the concern over
a lack of independence is taken out of the equation, an immediate
question becomes whether the court has the institutional capacity to
offer fair and effective resolution of the vast majority of ordinary
cases. With the support of the CCP to build a judiciary with integrity,
the answer to the above question can be affirmative.
That raises the final characteristic of the rule of law under
authoritarianism, which is a lack of deep moral commitment to
limited government and liberty. In China, the reform promotes a thin,
formal version of the rule of law without asking harder, more
substantive questions related to the version of the rule of law. The
thin version of rule of law focuses on the internal quality of law, such
as the requirement that law must be public, accessible, generally
applicable, clear, prospective, and consistent on the whole. It focuses
on the institutional dimension of enforcement and requires valid
rules for law-making, fair application of law, effective enforcement
and general acceptance of rules.21
Critics of this thin version of rule of law point out that it does
not provide a normative foundation, and it is therefore "thin" because
it is not supported by a rights-based system commonly observed in a
liberal democracy. Legal reform in this context is largely illiberal;
the legal system the CCP is building is not rights-based. Instead,
reform efforts have been concentrated on developing a rule of law
system to ensure certainty, clarity, and to some extent, procedural
fairness. The law is used to improve government effectiveness and
enhance state capacity and legitimacy. However, it does not restrain
the CCP itself. As China has been institutionalizing, regularizing,
and professionalizing their courts, it is still encountering
insurmountable difficulties inherent in the political system.
III. Judicial Reform in China
Since the late 1970s, Chinese courts have undergone a continuous
reform process of professionalization and institutionalization.22
Despite the political constraints, there are sufficient opportunities and
incentives to continue China's judicial reform so as to enhance judicial
capacity and rebuild trust and credibility. It is undeniable that the
21. RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RuLE OF LAW (2002).
22. Id.
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Chinese judiciary has been improving itself in noticeable ways
through enhancing professionalism, institutionalization, and
autonomy.
The CCP has made efforts to make judgeships an attractive
profession in comparison with other civil services. Indeed, a well-
educated judiciary places its own demand on the quality of the
judiciary and takes pride in its profession. When the quality of the
judiciary remains unsatisfactory, judges quit, adding internal
pressure on the CCP to improve the judicial conditions.23 In response
to the challenge, China has started a new round of judicial reform.24
Under the leadership of Zhou Qiang, the first Chief Justice who
received formal legal education in the reform era, a prototype of a
(further) reformed judiciary is slowly taking shape in Shanghai,
Shenzhen, and other key pilot cities. The core feature of this round of
reform is the creation of a separate judicial track within the civil
service."
While the creation of a separate judicial track is important in
boosting judicial morale, it is not intended to generate a sense of
judicial independence. It is principally a financial incentive to
rationalize and stabilize the judiciary.2 6 A separate judicial track
creates more opportunities for career enhancement by decoupling
salary and rank. Judges, like other civil servants, are facing a more
acute problem. The administrative rank of a basic court, where the
23. Judges have been leaving courts en masse to take positions in the private sectors. In
Shanghai, for example, more than seventy judges resigned in 2013 and eighty-six judges did
so in 2014. In the five year before 2013, an average of sixty-seven judges left the judiciary
per year. The commonly cited reason is high pressure and low pay. Those who left tended
to be middle-aged and talented judges in coastal cities. See 86 Judges Resigned from Courts
in Shanghai Last Year; Would Judicial Reform Weaken the Waves ofResigning?, EASTDAY,
Apr. 20, 2015, available at http://shzw.eastday.com/shzw/G/20150420/ulail47926.ht
ml.(last visited Oct. 14, 2015); see also Designing Waves Appeared in Judicial Institutions
and the Numbers are Increasing, SoHu NEWS, available at http://news.sohu.com/2015
0415/n41131 1749.shtml (last visited Oct. 14, 2015) (for the case in other major cities); see
also Stanley Lubman, China's Exodus of Judges, CHINA REAL TIME, May 24, 2015,
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/05/04/what-a-stubborn-exodus-of-judges-meansfor-le
gal-reform-in-china (last visited Oct. 14, 2015) (an insightful comment).
24. CPC, supra note 13; PEERENBOOM, supra note 14.
25. Jian Zhang & Xueyu Liu, Procurators and Judges Removed from the Rank of Civil
Servants?, JINGHUA, June 16, 2014, http://epaper.jinghua.cn/html/2014-06/16/content_9
6872.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
26. Xing Shiwei, Shanghai Judicial Reform Plan: Judges' Income Higher than
Ordinary Civil Servants by 43%, NEWS 163, Apr. 24, 2015, available at http://news.163
.com/15/0424/02/ANUCSOU800014AED.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
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vast majority of judges in China work, was kept to a low level and
there were a large number of judges working in a low ranking
station. Naturally, promotion opportunities were limited and without
promotion salaries were capped. It was impossible for most judges to
have their salary increased beyond a certain point. To deal with the
large number of frustrated judges, the reform proposes a separate
track of civil servants for judges separating salary and rank so that
there is a salary increment without promotion in rank. In conclusion,
the revised judicial track is a significant move in the context of a
larger judicial reform. It will boost judicial morale and strengthen
judicial identity.
Moreover, judging is now an institutionalized professional
practice. After decades of incremental reforms, there are well-
established judicial rules, procedures, and practices that have
accumulated within the Chinese judiciary. If a political ethos defined
the courts in the Maoist China before 1980s, professionalism defines
the judiciary in the reform period, in spite of continuing attempts to
politicize the court.27 The courts have been introducing reform
measures since the late 1970s, and those institutionalized practices
have largely survived and proven to be resilient. With the exception
of a range of politically sensitive cases, as mentioned below, courts
have demonstrated the potential to adjudicate cases fairly and
effectively as Chinese law requires. Even under the one party
framework, it is still possible for most judicial decisions to offer a
degree of certainty and predictability. This is because of improved
rule-making, rule-based decision-making, and the diminished role of
corruption and bias in the process.28 In the future, judging ordinary
cases in China will look more like judging elsewhere, especially in
countries sharing a common legal tradition and at a similar level of
prosperity.
Third, within limits noted above, and as outlined more fully
below, the judiciary as an institution has become more autonomous
in adjudicating cases and in designing accountability mechanisms.
Professionalized judges have demanded autonomy in judicial
decision making. Waves of judicial reform in China are efforts to
reflect and institutionalize the professional demand. With the further
27. Minzner, supra note 11.
28. Benjamin Liebman, China 's Courts: Restricted Reform, 191 CHINA Q., September
2007, at 620; YUWEN Li, THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND REFORM IN POST-MAO CHINA:
STUMBLING TowARDs JUSTICE (Ashgate, 2014).
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improvement of legal education and training, there will be a stronger
and more distinct judicial identity.
Ironically, autonomy also comes from the CCP. The Party's
attitude toward judicial decisions has evolved and although there has
been frequent and significant pushback against autonomy, the larger
trend since the late 1970s has been one of increased autonomy in
judicial decision-making. The CCP itself has decided not to make
decisions on individual cases and has passed resolutions to prohibit
any improper influences on, or interferences in, individual cases. The
CCP has also created a mechanism through which judicial personnel
in charge of a case shall note and record any improper influence on
that case and file a complaint with the relevant disciplinary
authorities.29 A similar mechanism has also been created to prohibit
improper influences within legal institutions.30 While judicial
independence in mature legal systems may depend on separation of
powers, in China it must to rely principally on self-regulation and
self-discipline of the ruling party.
Furthermore, judicial autonomy under the current reform is
reflected in vertical and horizontal aspects. Vertically, the courts are
trying to assert their institutional separation from other political and
legal institutions, like the police and procuracy, in issues ranging
from rule-making to individual decision-making. It is common
knowledge that China operates a police-centric criminal justice
system. Police have a significantly higher political status than the
procuracy and the court.3 1 The police exercise broad legal powers in
maintaining public order, carrying out criminal investigation, and
imposing administrative penalties without effective judicial
supervision. In criminal cases, the procuracy and court largely defer
29. "Lingdao Ganbu Ganyu Sifa Huodong, Chashou Juti Anjian Chuli de Jilu, Tongbao
he Zeren Zhuijiu Guiding" Yinfa (#'#FM+4±$L J -i@
, AfM ih >) XINHUA NEWS, Mar. 30, 2015, available at http://news.
xinhuanet.com/2015-03/30/c 1114812232.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
30. Zhongyang Zhengfa Wei Yinfa "Sifa Jiguan Neibu Renyuan Guowen Anjian de Jilu
he Zeren Zhuijiu Guiding" (,P Ali < 9 T} R A Mi ht [)V# Mi2,Af *
18%$A>>), XINHUA NEWS, Mar. 30, 2015, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/2015-
03/30/c 1114812926.htm.
31. Fu Hualing (ft$f), A Bird in the Cage: Police and Political Leadership in PRC,
4 POLICING AND SOCIETY 277 (1994); Fu Hualing ({$40), Autonomy, Courts and the
Political Order in Contemporary China, in HANDBOOK OF CHINESE CRIMINOLOGY 76 (Cao
Liqun et al. eds., 2013); Fu Hualing ( ) After Dictatorship: The Nature and Function
of the Police in Post-Mao China, in POLICING, SECURITY AND DEMOCRACY: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 259 (M. Amir & S. Einstein eds., Office of Int'l Crim. Just. 2001).
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to police investigative decisions.
While there is a police-centric structure remaining in operation,
there are some early signs that the Party is prepared to shift the center
of the criminal process from police investigation to trials. If the 1979
Criminal Procedural Law (CPL) was successful in laying an
institutional framework for regulating power in the criminal process,
the 1996 and 2012 Amendments of the CPL, and the subsequent
policy reforms, have created significant formal procedural constraints
in the process.3 2 These constraints have the potential to shift the
gravitas of the criminal process gradually, but forcefully, to the courts.
In their reform agenda, the police have committed to a criminal
process that centers on trials and is prepared to accept judicial scrutiny
on matters relating to torture and lawfulness of police evidence.33 This
is a significant first step in developing judicial control over the entire
criminal justice system in China. For example, a high profile decision
to find murder suspects not guilty for lack of evidence indicates
exemplifies judicial strength and the determination to act
independently and forcefully against police decisions.34
Horizontally, the Party is removing the control of local
governments over the courts by centralizing court financing and
judicial appointments and redefining jurisdictions. Given the
difficulty the Party has faced in controlling defiance and resistance in
the policy process, this reform seems a logical move to ensure local
accountability and compliance with central decisions. As commonly
observed, local protectionism is one of the significant barriers in
developing rule of law in China and when local courts are placed
under local political control they serve localized political and
economic interests.35
There is a serious attempt to separate judges from management
staff in the court on a permanent basis, so as to "de-bureaucratize"
32. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CHINA 390 (Mike McConville
& Eva Pils eds., 2013).
33. "Guanyu Quanmian Shenhua Gong'an Gaige Ruogan Zhongda Wenti de Kuangiia
Yifian" JiXiangguan Gaige Fang'an Yifing Zhongyang Shenyi Tongguo (<<-Ti i & f
fB xINHUA NEWS,
Feb. 15, 2015, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2015-02/15/c_1114379121.htm
(last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
34. Josh Chin, China Top Judge Apologizes for Wrongful Convictions, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 12, 2015, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-top-judge-apologizes-for-
wrongful-convictions- 1426184136 (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
35. Stanley Lubman, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO (1999)
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the judiciary and prioritize the role of trial judges in the adjudication
process. With more power to make individual decisions, judges are
also expected to shoulder more responsibilities. The enhanced
accountability would necessarily reinforce judges' fidelity to law and
independent decision-making on the part of the judges. The reform
highlights the real (or perceived) tension between judges and their
managers and the possibility of a diminished bureaucratic control
within the courts. Court presidents and other managing judges
routinely design multiple measures to control judges in the judicial
process. They shape not only the decision-making process but also
the substance of the decisions. In general, managing judges are
reluctant to allow other judges make decisions without prior
approval. They believe any relaxation in judicial control would lower
the quality of court decisions. From this perspective, the real threat to
judicial independence comes from the heart of the courts - those who
have control over the decision-making process.3 6
Needless to say, there are frequent setbacks in the reform
process. However, it is important to note that regardless of the
setbacks, the Chinese judiciary has become noticeably different.
Chinese judicial reform can be described as incremental, since
reform programs are often followed by severe setbacks resulting in
the rolling back of the recently implemented reform.3 7 However,
most of the institutional innovations and designs survive the
setbacks. They gradually settle and then form part of the established
practices with each reform episode adding a new element to judicial
practice.
36. Li Jingyun, Court Reform is Not Merely to End Performance Evaluation, S.
METROPOLIS DAILY, Feb. 1, 2015, http://epaper.oeeee.com/epaper/A/html/2015-02/01/ cont
ent_3383582.htm?div=0.
37. See Fu, supra note 5 (China's court reform has been moving forward in a zigzag
way. The judicial reform programs of the 1980s were largely suspended in the aftermath of
the 1989 crackdown on the students-led democratic movement. Between 1998 and 2002,
Xiao Yang, the Chief Justice during that period, led a systematic court reform to
professionalize China's judiciary. However, his successor, Wang Shengjun, shelved and
reversed the core aspects of the Xiao reform in the subsequent ten years. The current Chief
Justice, Zhou Qiang, continued the court reform that Xiao Yang started.
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IV. A Dual Legal System in China's Neo-authoritarianism
What would be the best case scenario for fostering ethical
integrity of the Chinese judiciary? Over time and because of the
accumulative impact of the limited reform, there will be a distinct
judicial community with a common identity and interest. As
previously stated, Chinese judges are better educated and trained in
terms of the overall professional education, continuing judicial
training, and knowledge of foreign practices and ideas. Judging will
continue to be institutionalized in terms of more entrenched judicial
formality, more specialist rules of procedure for adjudication, and
rigorous codes of conduct for judges. As a result, there will be an
enhanced judicial integrity as part of the legal process. Eventually, the
Chinese judiciary has the ability to exist more independently from
other legal institutions and local political authorities.
Still, the reform will continue to be carried out within the existing
political framework. Rule of law and judicial professionalism are
possible to the extent they may strengthen and legitimize the CCP's
rule. Within this authoritarian context, even in the best case scenario,
the courts will continue to be submissive to the CCP and compliant to
its political demand. Courts will still defer to the CPP in political or
otherwise "sensitive" cases and the judiciary will not be able to make
public policies, strike down unconstitutional legislation, or rule
independently on politically controversial matters. The court will
continue to play a limited role in supervising the party-state.
The primary function of the court system is to offer efficient
dispute resolution for the vast majority of individual cases, thereby
instilling social harmony and maintaining social stability - an essential
political mission for courts in authoritarian states. To be effective for
an institution that is politically weak, the judiciary must develop a
sufficient degree of credibility that it is: independent from political and
social influences, neutral to the parties before it, and fair in applying
rules. China is likely to develop a judiciary that is politically
submissive, but professionally capable of offering effective and fair
legal solutions to disputes. Ultimately, judicial credibility will build on
the professional standing of judges, transparency of the judicial
process, a rule-based decision-making process, and, above all, the
personal integrity of the judges.
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